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This paper discusses the implications of buyers and 
sellers being influenced by the information they receive 
and how that impacts their decision-making process in 
the context of a high-value low-frequency transaction 
(HVLFT). Using an exploratory case study, we explore 
a dark dimension of knowledge where tacit or explicit 
knowledge has been lost, distorted, suppressed, 
misrepresented, or misappropriated resulting in 
ambiguity and increased risk in decision making. The 
case study focuses on the decision-making process and 
the information flow seen from the perspective of 
different stakeholders involved in a HVLFT. Based on 
this case study we propose, articulate, and apply a 
model that explicitly acknowledges the dark side of 
knowledge. Our findings suggest the need for the 
application of convergent technologies to ameliorate 
the risk and asymmetricity caused by the dark side of 
knowledge and enhance governance particularly in the 
context of HVLFT.  
1. Introduction  
In a commercial setting, the dark side of knowledge 
has been widespread and has existed ever since we have 
been trading goods. There has always been tension 
between profit and honesty. This tension often leads to 
the misuse of asymmetric information between a seller 
and a buyer [1]. In a high-value low-frequency 
transaction (HVLFT), we are committing a large part of 
our financial wealth to an asset that we may only buy or 
sell a few times in our lifetime. The low-frequency 
means that a buyer is per definition a novice buyer and 
cannot leverage his decision making on past 
experiences. [4]. The HVLFT can have a lifelong 
financial impact on a buyer that is unaware of the risk 
associated with the purchase. Also, the decision-making 
process of a buyer is affected by a HVLFT. This 
decision- making process could be compared to asking 
a person to walk across a board laid down on a living- 
room floor (i.e. regular transaction) and then asking 
them to repeat that same feat but suspending that same 
plank across a canyon with a 100-meter drop on both 
sides (i.e. HVLFT). 
To support the decision-making process of a novice 
buyer we propose the TEX model [25, 26], adding a 
dimension to the classic tacit and explicit divide of 
information [11]. The TEX Model has been used as a 
guide in our case study, whilst interviewing 31 
participants in the New Zealand (NZ) real estate 
industry.  
2. Knowledge Management 
Knowledge management is often viewed as the 
interaction among people, process, and technology. This 
interaction is frequently portrayed in a firm setting. 
Brooking [5] advances a broader view and defines 
knowledge management as the approach we manage 
human-centred assets. Its function is to guard and grow 
knowledge owned by individuals, and where possible, 
transfer the assets into a form where they can be more 
readily shared by others. The crux of the theory is to 
devise different strategies to capture the tacit knowledge 
from individuals and convert them into explicit 
knowledge, making them readily available and 
transferable to many [32]. 
 
2.1 Tacit and Explicit Knowledge 
 
The distinction between tacit and explicit 
knowledge is a fundamental concept in knowledge 
management [11]. It was first purported by Polanyi [42], 
“we know more than we can tell.” The difference 
between tacit and explicit is also acknowledged by 
Alavi and Leidner [2]. Nonaka and Takeuchi [41] define 
tacit knowledge as “personal knowledge embedded in 
individual experience and involves intangible factors 
such as personal beliefs, perspective and value 
systems.” Explicit knowledge is the converse of tacit 
knowledge. Explicit knowledge can be expressed in 
code and is not subject to multiple interpretations, while 
tacit knowledge can be subdivided into knowledge that 
has not been formalised and knowledge that cannot be 
formalised. Hedesstrom and Whitley [23] emphasise 





that once knowledge has been formalised, it becomes 
explicit. This is further extrapolated by Nonaka and 
Takeuchi [41] in their SECI model showing the 
complexity of coding tacit knowledge into explicit 
knowledge. Dalkir [11] furthermore posits that the 
primary division in knowledge is between tacit and 
explicit knowledge. However, Collins [10] notes that 
tacit knowledge is a relative concept: what is easily 
articulated by one person may be very difficult to 
externalise by another. Thus, the same content may be 
explicit for one person and tacit for another. Underlying 
the terminologies of tacit and explicit knowledge there 
is a plethora of literature referring to implicit 
knowledge, which is simply defined as all non- explicit 
knowledge and is interwoven with the term tacit 
knowledge [13]. 
Davenport and Prusak [12] describe knowledge as 
a mix of experiences, contextual information, values, 
and expert insights. Within organisations, this becomes 
embedded not only in document repositories but also in 
routines, processes, and practices. In contrast, Fahey and 
Prusak [19] argue the importance of creating a shared 
context. The starting point of “managing knowledge” is 
to convey the shared context between the individuals 
participating in knowledge sharing. However, a lack of 
trust impacts the willingness to share information 
between stakeholders while, conversely, the sharing of 
tacit knowledge can be induced by trust [7]. 
We can synthesise the abovementioned literature in 
a simple dynamic model (Figure 1). Where a body of 
knowledge is divided into tacit and explicit knowledge. 
There is a flow of knowledge being codified from tacit 
to explicit, and there is explicit knowledge that is lost 
and reverted to tacit knowledge. 
 
Figure 1. Classic tacit / explicit division 
 
To give two practical examples from the NZ real 
estate industry, the Red arrow in Figure 1 indicates the 
flow of tacit to explicit knowledge: the real estate agent 
voices that the house situated on a cliff face has been 
there for 40 years and has never moved. A geo-tech 
engineer makes this explicit by testing the land and 
providing a detailed report on potential problems. 
Conversely, the Blue arrow indicates the flow of explicit 
to tacit knowledge; when a house is sold but the 
warranties are not transferred to the new owner. The 
explicit information is lost and becomes tacit. 
 
2.2 Knowledge asymmetry in HVLFT 
 
Knowledge sharing in a competitive environment 
has its own set of challenges. Stakeholders participating 
in a HVLFT often face the issue of information and 
knowledge asymmetry. Asymmetric information and 
knowledge are broad domains and have been of concern 
from the very origins of humanity. There have been 
many approaches to obtain a fairer outcome of 
transactions. One of the earliest on record is the envy-
free cake cutting techniques based on “divide and 
choose” as described in the Bible (Book of Genesis, 
Chapter 13). Economists have discussed the asymmetric 
information problem since the eighteenth century [22, 
35]. An asymmetric information taxonomy was 
formalised in the 70s through  several  prominent  
contributions.  Akerlof [1] describes the negative 
financial impact that information discloser has on a 
transaction from a seller's perspective. The taxonomy is 
further extrapolated by three models underpinning the 
behavioural experience between the sender and receiver 
of asymmetric information. First, we have the Adverse 
Selection Model proposed by Rothschild and Stiglitz 
[47]. It is still used in economics, insurance, and risk 
management today, portraying the seller having more 
information than the buyer. Second, the Moral Hazard 
Model explains the change in the behaviour of a buyer 
or a seller due to the lack of perceived risk [27]. Finally, 
Spence [50] describes two parties that have access to 
different information signified by the Signalling Model 
— observing the knowledge gap between an 
organisation and a job applicant. 
In the quest to finding the best negotiation 
tactic/strategy in an environment dominated by 
asymmetric information, a fundamental principle of 
game theory was developed, and aptly named the 
revelation principle [18]. This principle was founded on 
the agent being incentivised, to tell the truth [30, 39]. 
This principle provides the discovery of the best 
negotiation mechanism in the least amount of time. 
Opposing the revelation theory is the Bayesian game 
theory. This theory relies on negotiating agents having 
incomplete information [37, 39]. Under the Bayesian 
game theory and the auction strategy, selling an object 
and trying to maximise the return from multiple buyers 
is valid from a seller's perspective [38]. Various types of 




bid [45]. The Bayesian game theory is currently the 
modus operandi for most HVLFT [1]. 
 
2.3 The dark side of knowledge 
 
The dark side of knowledge is conceptualised as an 
unwillingness to share information so as not to lose a 
competitive advantage [48]. The dark side of knowledge 
management and the unethical motives that endanger 
capturing knowledge include distortion (e.g. 
manipulating specific knowledge in favour of particular 
interests, viewpoints, or beliefs); suppression (e.g. 
creating obstacles and using the knowledge that is 
contrary to particular interests); and misappropriation 
(e.g. modification, theft, or inappropriate revelation of 
knowledge) [3]. In a transaction with multiple unaligned 
stakeholders, the dark side needs to be understood on 
how it could influence the information shared among 
them. If we focus on the dark side of knowledge in the 
context of a HVLFT, then we need to understand the 
interplay between the different stakeholders within a 
transaction. 
In addition, sticky knowledge and leaky knowledge 
are two other important concepts that characterise 
knowledge sharing. There are two schools of thought on 
the stickiness of knowledge. One is the educational view 
that knowledge stickiness measures the knowledge that 
retains with the student. And the other is the 
management view of sticky knowledge that occurs when 
tacit knowledge is difficult to codify and transfer [20]. 
For knowledge surrounding HVLFT, we will adhere to 
the management view of sticky knowledge. 
Motivational barriers to knowledge transfer are well 
known in the management literature [28]. Resistance to 
change, competitive advantage, job protection, and lack 
of incentives are potential barriers; and transfer of 
knowledge is often laborious, time- consuming, and 
challenging [51]. Within an organisation, stickiness is 
exacerbated by the difficulties in that process of 
transferring knowledge [51]. Knowledge leakage occurs 
when information seeps out of the system, causing 
knowledge to be lost. For a HVLFT, it is important to 
distinguish the difference between the dark side of 
knowledge and knowledge leakage. The main difference 
is that the leakage of information is an unintentional loss 
of knowledge, and the dark side is the intentional misuse 
of knowledge. To use a metaphor, we see information 
flowing through plumbing pipes between stakeholders. 
The stickiness causes blockages in the flow, often 
through time and changing stakeholders; and the 
leakage is the loss of information [15]. The literature 
makes a distinction of other concepts of knowledge 
apart from the classic tacit and explicit divide, as 
described above. Also, the understanding, experience, 
and learning are important considerations in a HVLFT. 
The different forms of such knowledge (data, 
information, knowledge, wisdom, understanding, 
experience, and/or learning) which is neither tacit nor 
explicit, we deem as belonging to knowledge dimension 
X. More formally we define knowledge in dimension X 
as tacit or explicit knowledge that has now been lost, 
distorted, suppressed, misrepresented, or 
misappropriated resulting in ambiguity and increased 
risk in decision making. 
3. The Case Study 
3.1 Background 
 
The primary research instrument was an 
exploratory case study using semi-structured interviews. 
According to Yin [52], identifying the unit of analysis 
and the “key” participants are vital to a case study 
design. The unit of analysis was the NZ real estate 
industry. During the pilot study, six main categories of 
stakeholders were identified: buyer, seller, real estate 
agent, government, lawyer, and specialist. The NZ 
residential real estate has all the characteristics of a 
HVLFT. The stakeholders mentioned above have all the 
characteristics needed to understand the three research 
questions: 1) what asymmetric information in a HVLFT 
is, 2) what causes asymmetric information in a HVLFT, 
and 3) how we counterbalance asymmetric information 
in a HVLFT. The steps undertaken in the interview 









This qualitative case study allows exploratory 
research into an industry and to build a theory on the 
current situation from within, utilising deductive and 
inductive process to formalise the theory [16]. 
Step 1: A questionnaire was designed to understand 
the viewpoint of the stakeholders involved in a 
residential real estate transaction in NZ. The base 
questionnaire focussed on the decision-making process 
within a transaction between a buyer and a seller. For 
the other stakeholders, a personalised version of the 
questionnaire was developed, which focus on their 
specific role within the transaction. 
Step 2: Semi-structured interviews were conducted 
at a place of the participants choosing. Due to the 
COVID 19 lockdown, most of the interviews were 
conducted using Zoom the video conferencing 
application. 
Step 3: Each interview was transcribed and 
returned to the participant in order to check for 
inaccuracies or privacy breaches. If amendments were 
made they were returned to the participants to recheck. 
This reiterative process was completed once the 
participants agreed that the data could be used for the 
intended research purpose. 
Step 4: Initial nodes were developed for responses 
from the participants that aligned with three main 
themes (a) the three research questions (b) the phases of 
the Decision Making Process Model [25] and (c) the 
TEX Model. 
Step 5: The nodes were populated by the responses 
(answers and statements) given by the various 
participants. The text was highlighted and collated with 
the nodes using practical examples and responses of 
agreeing or disagreeing with the above- mentioned 
themes. 
Step 6: The text was analysed a second time 
extracting nodes that were outside the scope of the three 
described themes. Highlighting differences in 
geographical location, perceived risk, emotional 
responses, decision making, and processes that needed 
to be improved. Also, the text highlighted in step 5 was 
used for multiple nodes where applicable. 
Step 7: Patterns were established, new nodes were 
aggregate and new themes developed. 
Step 8: The responses per node were summarised 
and the responses per participant collated as 
“favourable/against/ neutral”. A framework of 
stakeholders and their responses per theme was created. 
 Step 9: New models were developed, and current 
models reaffirmed or refined. 
 
3.3 Sample Size 
 
There is a low level of transparency regarding 
sample sizes in an industry-wide case study [6, 33]. 
Often, authors suggest that saturation needs to be 
achieved, inferring that the addition of more 
stakeholders did not add anything to the analysis. Mason 
et al. [33] research on 429 doctoral theses found the 
mode was 25 participants. Malterud et al. [31] propose 
the concept of “information power” to ascertain the 
sample size needed for a qualitative study. The higher 
the information power is the smaller the sample size can 
be. Information power is determined by five criteria; 
represented in Table 1. 
Combining the findings from Mason et al. [33] and 
Malterud et al. [31], our sample size was 31 participants. 
Initially, the number of participants was variable 
depending on the representation of the various voices 
within a group of stakeholders and dictated by the 
saturation point of new insights gained [36]. 
 
Criteria Info 
Power HVLFT in NZ Real Estate 
Sample 
Size 
Aim of the 
study 




Dense (Expertise)  
 








Cross Case (Different Fields)  
 




Identifying and selecting the stakeholders followed 
a structured approach to secure a representative sample. 
1. For the buyers, a mix of novice (first-time) and 
experienced (more than 5 properties purchased) 
buyers were selected. Also, a combination of rural 
and urban backgrounds were included to provide an 
in-depth picture. 
2. For the seller, a mix of novice (first-time) and 
experienced (more than 5 properties sold) sellers 
were selected. Also, a combination of rural and 
urban backgrounds were included to provide an in-
depth picture. 
3. The real estate agent had a minimum of 10 years’ 
experience. Such experience provided insights into 
changes that occurred in the industry over time. 
And, a plethora of practical examples of the 
possible misuse of asymmetric information 
between buyer and seller. 
4. Government participants with knowledge of 
council requirements, which are linked to the 
resource management act (RMA), were selected. 
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This information is crucial in purchasing a property 
in NZ. 
5. A lawyer who operated in the rural context and one 
that operated in an urban context were selected. 
Both specialised in conveyancing and had more 
than 10 years’ experience. 
6. A mortgage specialist who could provide insights 
into the financial impact of purchasing a property 
was selected. 
7. Specialists were selected who are commonly 
requested to produce reports and services that are 
linked to a property sale. 
To generalise these stakeholders beyond the NZ 
real estate market we aligned the main stakeholder 
categories with the Governance, Risk and Compliance 
(GRC) model [44]. We further divided the seven main 
stakeholders into smaller sub- categories, which also 
aligned with the GRC model, as shown in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2: Stakeholders interviewed 
 
3.4 Data Collection 
Participants were asked open-ended questions and 
encouraged to describe situations in significant detail. 
They were allowed to ask questions to clarify the posed 
questions. The estimated time per interview was 
between 20 and 30 minutes, however, the duration was 
extended when new insights were being uncovered.  The 
semi-structured interviews were recorded and 
transcribed. Codes were used to assign meaning to the 
descriptive information compiled during the study [34]. 
The qualitative data analysis software (NVivo) was 
utilised to explore asymmetric information in HVLFT, 
the causation of asymmetric information in HVLFT, and 
how asymmetric information in HVLFT can be 
counterbalanced. The coding process was supported by 
procedural memos to keep track of any changes in the 
thematic nodes [9]. 
The NZ residential real estate industry was used to 
scope the case study and view the phenomena of 
asymmetric information in a HVLFT through the eyes 
of participants. Realising the pitfalls of the 
dramaturgical model [21], the follow-up questions 
asked during the interview process produced the most 
explanatory data. Eliciting the stakeholders to provide 
their un-reserved opinions, consequently captured 
unanticipated information [17]. Listening to the 
subliminal meaning behind statements and reflecting 
back to deepen the conversation ensured that the 
meaning was understood [8]. The developed 
questionnaire was a guide to the interview allowing the 
researcher to switch between questions and ask 
supplementary questions to gain a deeper understanding 
on the participant’s specific expertise. 
 
3.6 Interview Process 
 
The structure focused on the decision-making 
process and what information was needed to support this 
process. 
• Decision-making process of a buyer/seller on the 
abstract level (macro) 
• Decision-making process of a buyer/seller on a 
detailed level (micro) 
• Negotiation process 
• Information gathering process 
• Trusting the information received from the different 
stakeholders 
• Procedure how information is provided 
• Technologies used to gather information and 
support a decision 
• Data that is relied upon to make a decision 
The questionnaire was specifically designed for the 
three main categories; buyer, seller, and real estate 
agent. For the other categories, tailor-made additional 
questions were drafted per participant to understand 
their specific role in the process.  
The questions were designed to understand the 
phenomena of asymmetric information in a HVLFT 
from the perspective of the various stakeholders 
involved. Focussing on the social construct of how the 
stakeholders view a HVLFT [36].   
As mentioned, the data was collected through semi-
structured interviews. The developed questionnaire was 
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a guide to the interview allowing the researcher to 
switch between questions and ask supplementary 
questions to gain a deeper understanding of the 
participant’s responses and expertise. Two categories of 
questions were asked about (a) the current process and 
their perceptions on the quality of information and (b) 
potential future scenarios that address some of the 
current problems by leveraging appropriate technology.  
 Current description of processes and perceptions of 
information quality: 
• How they gather relevant information to support 
their decision. 
• How they choose their information sources 
• How they determine the market price 
• How accurate they perceive the information to be 
• How they trust the information received 
• How they choose a property 
• How they negotiate 
• Potential procedural and technological responses 
that overcome current problems: 
• How they would challenge potential mistakes made 
in the process 
• How they would improve the process 
• How technology can support their decision 
• How they would like to receive the information 
needed 
The participants were initially selected through 
personal networks and further recruitment through a 
snowballing process during the interviews. The 
participant received an invitation email with the 
participant information sheet (PIS) and a consent form 
(CF). Due to the COVID 19 Level 4 lockdown, all 
interviews were conducted through video conferencing 
(Zoom). The interviews were recorded via video (mp4) 
and audio (mp3). We recognise that video recording led 
to a more structured response from the participant, 
eliminating the noise that a face to face interview has. 
This, in-turn shortened the interview process by 
approximately 15 minutes (20 to 40 minutes). The 
interview was then transcribed. All the participant 
personal information was deleted, and their name 
replaced by a code. A copy was sent via email to the 
participants with a personal email thanking them and 
requesting them to check the transcript and comment on 
anything they do not want to be disclosed. We noticed 
in the initial interviews that the participants were very 
aware of their reputation, and any “negative” remarks 
made about other stakeholders in the industry were 
asked to be deleted. 
The transcripts were imported into NVIVO 
software and auto coded per speaker. This provides the 
possibility to focus on the responses from each 
participant. Each transcript was coded line for line 
finding statements made on the common themes 
mentioned above. Also leaving room to code new and 
unexpected information presented in the interview. The 
participants also received a case classification on age 
(20-39, 40-59, 60+), gender (male, female), and 
geographical (urban, rural). 
 
3.7 Data Analysis 
 
The common themes between all stakeholders in a NZ 
real estate transaction are: 
• Misappropriation of information 
• Lack of available explicit information on a specific 
property 
• Not understanding all the risks involved in 
purchasing a property 
• Flaws in the current process of purchasing a 
property 
• The financial implications in securing a property 
• The rules and regulations faced by all experts 
• Differences in the geographic area (urban, rural, 
international) 
• It allows the following nodes to be aggregated: 
• Explicit Information (available) (Council Property 
File, Legal (documentation), LIM Report, LINZ 
(title info), Specialist Reports) 
• Geographical (differences) (International, Rural, 
Urban) 
• Procedural Change (criticised or recommended) 
(Council, Legal, Real Estate, Specialist) 
• X (examples) (Fraud, Misinformation, Not 
understood, Withheld Information) 
4. Research Artefacts 
4.1 TEX Model  
 
Given the information gathered from the 
interviews, and from personal experience, there is a 
dimension missing in dividing a body of knowledge into 
tacit and explicit. We call this new dimension 
X. It aligns with the literature showing some forms 
of knowledge that are not fully captured by the classic 
tacit and explicit divide. Even if all information 
associated with HVLFT is presented explicitly, 
understanding them for a novice buyer can still be 
challenging [14]. Due to the low- frequency purchasing 
of high-value assets, the possibility of single, double, or 
triple loop learning is less applicable [4] among 
HVLFT. The terminology used by participants to 
describe tacit, explicit, and X are gathered in Table 3. X 
and its interactions with tacit and explicit are combined 
with the characteristics and relevant authors are shown 
in Table 4. 
 
4.2 Application of TEX 
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The flows are depicted in the Dynamic TEX Model 
shown below in Figure 3 and illustrates the 
transformations of the different types of knowledge at 
the nexus/vortex between the tacit, explicit, and 
X. The TEX model is proposed through a HVLFT lens, 
and especially through the eyes of the stakeholders in 
the real estate industry. The TEX model  can be applied 
to real  estate transactions  in NZ through the seven 
stakeholders: seller, buyer, council, lawyer, agent, 
banker, and specialist [25, 26]. Table 5 presents just a 
few insights gained from the semi-structured interviews 
held and provides a starting point to segment the various 
stakeholders. 
Figure 3. Dynamic TEX model 
 
As mentioned before, the chance for having single, 
double or triple loop learning for the buyer in HVLFT 
is low because the opportunity to reflect on a mistake 
is rare. Since the seller often has the advantage of 
asymmetric information [40], that could lead to sub-
optimal decision making by the buyer. Besides from 
real [43, 46], asymmetric information and knowledge 
in a transaction have been studied in other contexts [1, 
24] and business process design [49]. 
 
Explicit Tacit X 
Easy to codify Hard to codify Lack of understanding 











Externalised Internalised Hidden 
Structured Human interpretation Profit-driven 
Objective Subjective Slanted 
Rational Cognitive Loss of knowledge 









Hard to legally 
challenge Fraud 
 
Table 3. Terminologies used for TEX 
 
 
Description Transformation Characteristics Authors / Considerations 
Sticky Knowledge E => X The knowledge that is hard or impossible to transfer into explicit 
knowledge 
Szulanski (2000) 
Leaky Knowledge T => X Tacit knowledge is lost over time  














*Distort T/E => X Manipulating specific knowledge in favour of particular interests, 
viewpoints, or beliefs 
Alter (2006) 
*Suppress T/E => X Creating obstacles and using the knowledge that is 
contrary to particular interests 
Seidl (2007) 
* Mis-appropriate T/E =>X Modification, theft, or inappropriate revelation of 
knowledge 
Seidl (2007) 
Educational T/E => X Not understanding explicit and/ or tacit information. Unable to 
make an informed decision 
Jones, et al. (1980) 
Learning T/E => X Unable to adjust actions, assumptions, or context due to the low 
frequency of specific transactions 
Duguid (2005) 
Educational X => T/E Understanding on a specific body of knowledge increases Dreyfus (2004) 




X => E 
Regulations to improve the reliability of the information 
provided. Through regulations or sanctions 
Increased fines for 
misinformation, Anti-money 
laundering bill 





X => T/E 
Procedures in place to support government and 
technological responses 
Owners information 
registered, warranties linked 
Table 4. Knowledge flow between TEX dimensions 
 
The information inequality should be addressed by 
educating stakeholders about all three dimensions of the 
TEX model. The buyer needs to understand the tacit and 
explicit knowledge made available to them, and being 
aware of the motivation behind others to misuse X. For 




explicit knowledge such as technical drawing or report, 
may not understand the implication of them to the 
purchase of the property. This education layer is added 




Explicit Tacit X 
















Council Files, L.I.M, 
consents 
Explanation 























negate the sale 












Not liable for 
their report. 
Table 5: Examples of TEX per Stakeholder 
 
Figure 4: TEX model flows 
 
Given the characteristics of HVLVT, blockchain 
could be a suitable solution to address several of our 
concerns. For example, verifiable information could be 
stored onto some permissioned blockchain. This could 
address the issue of information asymmetry in many 
ways. First, all information would be time- stamped, 
situating the data in a historical context. Second, 
information would be verifiable since it will only be 
entered through trusted nodes. Third, it can give legal 
standing to the buyer if the information used to make a 
purchase decision was incorrect. Fourth, the same 
information previously collected does not have to be 
repeatedly sourced again, thus saving time and money. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
A poignant remark made by one participant is that 
councils in NZ have a bad reputation in archiving all the 
information on houses in their area. To evade this 
criticism councils often apologise by stating they have 
had a “fire in their records.” In the meantime, nearly 
every council office at some point has experienced this 
“fire”. This is a classic example of explicit information 
being lost. Throughout the interviews, there have been 
numerous examples of information flowing between the 
various TEX dimensions. Figure 5 summarises the 
remarks gathered from the case study on the information 
flow between T, E and X dimensions. 
The problem that arises is the motivational aspect 
of the stakeholders to participate in the information 
exchange on the blockchain. We need to understand 
their financial loss or gain in sharing information and 
list motivations per stakeholder to share verifiable 
information and how we can verify this information. 
Initially, from the seven stakeholders, only two benefit 
directly from the introduction of blockchain. The 
council increases its detailed information per household. 
The buyer lowers his cost in the due diligence process 
and benefits from the increased amount of verifiable 
data. We believe the government would need to be the 
catalyst to drive change in this space and motivate other 
stakeholders to change their behaviour. As mentioned, 
reducing both risk and initial cost in a transaction is the 
driving force. Counterbalancing the asymmetric 
information and increasing the knowledge and trust on 
the asset to be transacted, would be the largest 
contributors to risk reduction. 
As an incentive for the seller to participate in the 
transparency of the asset, the reduction of risk could 
have a positive impact on the sales price. There is a 
correlation between risk and the price a buyer is willing 
to offer. A buyer will counteract the risk by building in 
a margin to offset the perceived risk [29]. There is also 
a motivation for the specialist involved if we can 
convince seller before listing their property to acquire 
and register the reports on the blockchain to present an 
in-depth picture of their asset, thus reducing the buyer's 
risk. If we can motivate the buyer and seller to utilise 
blockchain for information sharing and use government 
as an initiator, we can counterbalance information 
asymmetry in HVLFT. 
As illustrated in Figure 5 we view the knowledge 
and information flows between the various stakeholders 
as potential contributors to asymmetric information. If 
we can focus our procedural and technological 




information asymmetry in a HVLFT. From the case 
study we have identified and discussed two main 
contributors towards asymmetric information in a 
HVLFT (X, noise, and education). In a HVLFT there are 
also a number of subtle contributors that influence 
asymmetric information in a positive or negative way 
(i.e. honesty, trust, financial gain,). These subtle 
contributors could be incorporated in a system dynamics 
model, namely a stock and flow diagram (Figure 6). 
This model enables us to modify the input and present 
the results in an interface to visualize the degree of risk 
associated with a HVLFT. Quantifying the amount of 
risk that is acceptable would require further research. 
This would increase our understanding of what 
contributes to asymmetric information and in how we 
could be observant of other factors that contribute 
towards asymmetric information. 
 
 
Figure 5: Information flow between dimensions based on participants remarks
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